Differences and similarities between scalar inferences and scalar modifiers: The case of quantifiers by McNabb, Yaron
Proceedings of SALT 25: 267–287, 2015
Differences and similarities between scalar inferences and scalar
modifiers: The case of quantifiers *
Yaron McNabb
Utrecht University
Abstract Despite the rich theoretical and experimental work on scalar implicature,
many of the studies on this topic were limited to some vs. all, neglecting the
cross-categorial pervasiveness of the phenomena. The few experimental studies
involving a more diverse group of scalar implicatures have found variation among
expressions in the likelihood they give rise to scalar implicature, thereby challenging
the assumption that scalar implicature (and generalized conversational implicature)
is a uniform phenomenon (Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson & Ward 2009; Doran,
Ward, Larson, McNabb & Baker 2012; van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina &
Geurts 2014). This paper presents a first, systematic investigation of the degree
to which a large group of quantifiers give rise to the implicature ‘not all’ using an
utterance compatibility task with a modified Likert scale. Two accounts for the
variation among quantifiers are proposed: (i) Shared semantic properties among
three coherent groups of quantifiers account for the degree they give rise to upper-
bound implicature; or (ii) the likelihood of an implicature is a function of the scalar
distance between the various quantifiers and ‘all.’ The predictions these two accounts
make are discussed, charting the way to a future investigation of the heterogeneity
of scalar implicature.
Keywords: scalar implicature, quantifiers, superlative modifiers, scalar diversity, experi-
mental pragmatics
1 Introduction
The scalar expression some in (1) is assumed to evoke a set of alternatives whose
members are ordered in terms of informativeness along the lines of (2). The use of
some implicates that informationally-stronger alternatives like most or all don’t hold
(Horn 1972; Gazdar 1979; Levinson 2000; Geurts 2010).
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(1) Some of Ann’s friends shared her view of the world as a dark place.
(2) <all, most, many, some>
Despite the rich theoretical and experimental work on scalar implicature, many
of the studies on this topic were limited to some vs. all, neglecting the cross-
categorial pervasiveness of the phenomena (but see Horn 1972 and Hirschberg
1985). The few experimental studies involving a more diverse group of scalar
implicatures have found variation among expressions in the likelihood they give
rise to scalar implicature, thereby challenging the assumption that scalar implicature
(and generalized conversational implicature) is a uniform phenomenon (Doran et al.
2009, 2012; van Tiel et al. 2014).
The main contribution of recent studies on the diversity of scalar implicature
to theoretical and experimental semantics and pragmatics is the finding that when
looking at a varied group of scalar expressions, additional linguistic and extralin-
guistic factors that increase the likelihood of an implicature emerge. This finding
provides a foundation to further explore these and other factors on heretofore ne-
glected expressions. Consider, for example, quantifiers: Doran et al. (2009) predict
that these expressions would be less susceptible to contextual factors such as salience
of alternates on a scale than, say, gradable adjectives. van Tiel et al. (2014) show that
the reliable factors are rather whether the strongest alternate, e.g., all, is a maximal
value, and the extent to which the quantifier in the utterance, e.g., a handful or most,
is closely associated with, and more distant (on the scale) than, the stronger alternate
all. The scope of both of these studies, however, meant that while a large and diverse
group of scalar expressions were examined, only a small number of members within
each linguistic category, e.g., quantified NPs, were tested, namely only some, most
and all.
In this study, 11 different quantifiers were examined in order to determine
whether what Doran et al. (2009) and van Tiel et al. (2014) found for a couple
quantified NPs is generalizable to a larger sample of these expressions. The rate
of scalar implicature the different quantifiers give rise to was tested in an utterance
compatibility judgement task, where participants evaluated a CLAIM with the quan-
tifier vis-à-vis a FACT with all. The results point to differences among quantifiers
with respect to the extent to which they give rise to a scalar implicature. Fractions
like quarter are the most likely to give rise to scalar implicature, whereas existential
quantifiers like a handful are less likely, and vague quantity expressions like a great
deal are the least likely to give rise to an implicature.
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2 Continuous vs. binary data and semantic vs. pragmatic upper bounds
Many studies in experimental semantics and pragmatics use a binary truth value
judgement task. An alternative to the binary task is a one that employs a Likert scale
or a continuous truth/false scale (or a version thereof). Each of these methodological
choices play a role in shaping participants’ responses. In the binary task, for example,
participants are forced to make sharp judgements even when their responses may be
more nuanced. Moreover, the binary understanding of truth and falsity in semantic
theories is a theoretical concept that may not correspond to speakers’ understanding
of ‘truth’ and ‘false’ (Hansen & Chemla 2013).
Responses from tasks using the Likert or the continuous truth/false scale are
meaning-measuring methods that should likewise be approached with great care.
We don’t know whether speakers start off with a gradient notion of truth and falsity,
and if they do, we don’t know what factors tilt a proposition or an utterance toward
the true or false end of such a scale. What we can do, as many researchers have, is
use a scale in order to allow for a gradient response and examine whether significant
contrasts in responses to different experimental conditions shed light on different
types of meaning, in this case semantic vs. pragmatic meaning. It’s crucial to point
out that no point on the scale should be interpreted as mapped onto a specific type
of meaning (e.g., logical or pragmatic meaning). That said, control items that are
unequivocally false or blandly true are expected to cluster around opposite end-points
on the scale.
In this study, I adapt the part of Doran et al.’s task which asks participants to
contrast a CLAIM and a FACT. Instead of asking participants whether the CLAIM
was true, given the FACT, I asked participants to rate how compatible the CLAIM
was with the FACT. Participants were asked to rate compatibility on a scale from
−3 to 3, where −3 was completely incompatible and 3 was completely compatible.
Such scales have been successfully used in Cummins & Katsos 2010 and McNabb &
Penka 2014, et seq. The intuition behind using a scale from a negative to a positive
number is that participants have shown to map three different types of semantic-
pragmatic status of an utterance on three different regions on the scale: semantically-
and pragmatically-felicitous utterances were mapped around the positive end of
the scale and semantically-anomalous or logically false utterances were mapped on
the negative end of the scale, both types of utterances showing a small variance.
The third type of utterances, utterances that were semantically well-formed but
pragmatically infelicitous, usually exhibited a large variance. It should be reiterated
that the exact points on the scale don’t (always) matter; rather, contrasts in the
response patterns is what I assume should be a sign of differences between different
types of meaning.
The extent to which participants draw a scalar implicature is usually experi-
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mentally determined vis-à-vis baseline or control items for which responses are
predicted to be at floor or ceiling with respect to the task. But very few studies
make a direct comparison between an entailed upper bound and an implicated one.
Modification by at most is a reliable way to impose an entailed—as opposed to an
implicated—upper bound. Krifka (1999) and Geurts & Nouwen (2007) observe that
at most imposes an uncancellable upper-bound on numeral, scalar and non-scalar
expressions. This is illustrated in (3-5), in which the upper-bound can be suspended
in the non-modified (a) sentences but not in the modified (b) sentences.
(3) a. Last night, Willow tested three new spells (, if not four).
b. Last night, Willow tested at most three new spells (#, if not four).
(4) a. Buffy read a handful of the books on the shelf (, if not all of them).
b. Buffy read at most a handful of the books on the shelf (#, if not all of
them).
(5) a. Dr. Walsh is an assistant professor (, if not an associated professor).
b. Dr. Walsh is at most an assistant professor (#, if not an associated
professor).
In the experiment reported in Section 3, I used quantified NPs modified by at
most as a baseline and compared it to the likelihood of upper-bound construal in
the non-modified cases. On the assumption that modification by at most leads to a
semantic upper bound whereby the modified term is interpreted as the maximal value
on a scale, significantly different and varied rates for the non-modified quantifier in
comparison can be interpreted as a cancellable (i.e., pragmatic) upper bound.
3 Methods
3.1 Preliminaries
Instead of constructing stimuli or drawing upon examples from the literature, I
gleaned 11 naturally-occurring utterances from the Corpus of Contemporary Ameri-
can English (COCA, Davies 2008), looking for quantifiers modified by at most. The
11 quantifiers, given in (6), were not chosen for their frequency.
(6) The 11 quantifiers used in the experiment:
a. a bunch
b. a couple
c. a few
d. a great deal
e. a handful
f. a multitude
g. a number
h. a quarter
i. a third
j. half
k. most
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For each of the 11 utterances, two factors were manipulated: (i) modification by
at most (or not) and (ii) the quantifier used (Q in (7)).
l.(7) Example utterance:
{Q / At most Q} of Ann’s friends shared her view of the world as a dark
place.
In order to ensure all 11 utterances were well-formed with all 11 quantifiers,
both modified and not modified, all the utterances were rated for well-formedness
by 10 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. All scored between 4 and 6 an
7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 6 (mean=5.04; SD=.81; median=5).
3.2 The task and procedure
Participants on Mechanical Turk rated the compatibility of pairs of CLAIMs and
FACTs on a modified Likert scale ranging from –3 to 3. In addition to the two modi-
fication conditions (non-modification and at most) and the 11 quantifier conditions,
there were also three discrepancy conditions that differed in the term used in the
follow-up, FACT statement: none, some and all, as illustrated in (8).
(8) Example stimulus:
Claim: {A / At most a} a handful of Ann’s friends shared her view of the
world as a dark place.
Fact: {None / Some / All} of Ann’s friends shared her view of the world as
a dark place.
How compatible is the CLAIM with the FACT?
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3
completely completely
incompatible compatible
I created 66 lists using a Latin Square design so that no participant saw the
same kind of combination of modification, quantifier and discrepancy condition
for a given sentence (=11 sentences × 11 quantifiers × 2 modification conditions
× 3 discrepancy conditions). Each of the 66 lists were evaluated by two different
participants (total of N=132). This allowed for 6 observations for each quantifier ×
modification × discrepancy per person.
4 Predictions
Different predictions can be made about the compatibility between the CLAIM and
the three discrepancy conditions in the FACT depending on whether the quantifier in
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question is modified by at most or not. Let’s consider the quantifier a handful as an
example. Horn’s (2001: 235–236) “suspender test” in (9-10) shows that a handful
asymmetrically entails some, given the contrast between the well-formed sentences
in (9a) and (10a) and the ill-formed sentences in (9b) and (10b). Given that a handful
entails some, it’s incompatible with none.
(9) a. I care about you Naruto. And I’m sure there’s some if not a handful of
people who do too.1
b. # I care about you Naruto. And I’m sure there’s a handful of, if not
some, people who do too.
(10) a. Many of them are hardheaded and ‘makulit’ but some, if not a handful
of them are amenable to change.2
b. # Many of them are hardheaded and ‘makulit’ but a handful, if not some
of them are amenable to change.
The case is less clear for at most a handful, which creates a downward-monotone
environment, licensing NPIs, as shown in (11). If the entailment pattern of at
most a handful is similar to other downward-monotone quantifiers like few, then at
most a handful is compatible with none. Moreover, we can suspend the purported
existential presupposition, as in (12), if we introduce speaker ignorance into the
utterance. Krifka (1999), however, notes that at most Q can introduce discourse
referents—albeit not as successfully as at least Q—suggesting that there may be
some cases in which at most carries what looks like an existential presupposition, as
illustrated in (13). I return to this issue in Section 6.3.
(11) I have read or viewed hundreds of news stories about the Pain-Capable
Unborn Child Protection Act over the past six months, and at most a handful,
or less, have made any mention of the Gonzales ruling[. . . ]3
(12) From what I remember, at most a handful of the news stories, if any, have
made any mention of the Gonzales ruling.
(13) a. ?? At most three boys left. They found the play boring.
b. At least three boys left. They found the play boring.
Finally, the critical conditions are the ones where the FACT contains all. While
a handful may be used to implicate ‘not all,’ at most a handful entails it. Table 1
summarizes the predictions for each experimental condition.
1 Source: http://www.bestfanfictions.com/s/3403741/2/Demon-s-Revenge
2 Source: http://www.rcmanila.org/sites/rcmanila.org/files/balita/MARCH-27-2014-BALITA.pdf
3 Source: http://www.lifenews.com/2015/06/11/american-college-of-obstetricians-and-gynecologists\
-has-become-a-de-facto-pro-abortion-group/
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CLAIM FACT Compatible? Reason
A handful . . . None . . . No Entails some
At most a handful . . . None . . . ? DE/Existential presupposition
A handful . . . Some . . . Yes Entailment relation
At most a handful . . . Some . . . Yes Entailment relation
A handful . . . All . . . No Implicature
At most a handful . . . All . . . No Contradiction
Table 1 CLAIM-FACT compatibility in the various experimental conditions
5 Results
The results of the experiment were analyzed with a mixed-effects ordered probit
regression model with random effects for subjects and items and fixed effects for
modifier, discrepancy and quantifier, using the Ordinal package (Christensen 2012)
on R. As can be seen in Figure 1, overall scores for claims with the quantifiers
modified by at most were significantly lower than scores for those with non-modified
quantifiers (β=1.36, SE=0.14, p<0.001). Scores for the all discrepancy condition
were significantly lower than those for the none discrepancy condition (β=0.35,
SE=0.15, p<0.05) and the some discrepancy condition (β=3.45, SE=0.17, p<0.001).
CLAIMs with none following FACTs with a quantifier modified by at most were
rated higher than when following FACTs with a non-modified quantifier (β=-4.32,
SE=0.26, p<0.001) and CLAIMs with some following FACTs with a non-modified
quantifier (β=-0.61, SE=0.20, p<0.01).
5.1 Quantifiers modified by at most
Zooming in on CLAIMs with quantifiers modified by at most, FACTs with all re-
ceived significantly lower scores than FACTs with none (β=0.42, SE=0.17, p<0.001)
and FACTs with some (β=4.10, SE=0.15, p<0.001). Most of the results are as ex-
pected, as all is incompatible with any of the 11 quantifiers when modified by at
most. Some, on the other hand, is expected to be compatible with all these quantifiers
when they’re modified by at most. Note that although the scores for none were low,
they were reliably different than those for all. This distinction will be discussed in
more detail in Section 6.3. There was no main effect of quantifier and no differences
between individuals quantifiers (p>0.05 for all comparisons).
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Figure 1 Mean responses (and standard errors) of compatibility of CLAIMs with
FACTs, per quantifier, per modification condition.
5.2 Non-modified quantifiers
For CLAIMs with non-modified quantifiers, FACTs with none received significantly
lower rates than FACT with all (β=3.54, SE=0.1, p<0.001) and FACTs with some
(β=6.12, SE=0.15, p<0.001). As expected, none was incompatible with all of the
11 quantifiers and some was compatible with all of them.
The scores for all followed by the non-modified quantifiers exhibit a great deal
of diversity. Pairwise comparisons point to a clustering of three groups: The first
group, including a third (mean=-1.73), a quarter (mean=-1.57), half (mean=-1.40),
and a couple (mean=-1.13), received the lowest compatibility ratings with all The
second group, including a handful(mean=-.27), a number (mean=-.13) and a bunch
(mean=.50), received middling compatibility ratings with all. And the third group,
including most (mean=1.03), a multitude (mean=1.03) and a great deal (mean=1.33),
received the highest compatibility ratings with all. The quantifier a few (mean=-.87)
wasn’t significantly different than all of the quantifiers in the first or the second
group and so falls between the two with respect to its compatibility with all.
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6 Discussion
The results of the experimental study of a heterogenous group of quantifiers provide
evidence for the diversity with which participants contrast these quantifiers with
all as a way to gauge the extent to which each one of these quantifiers leads to an
upper-bound construal. While Doran et al. (2009) and van Tiel et al. (2014) already
show that various scalar expressions, e.g., quantifiers, adjectives and modals, exhibit
different likelihoods of implicature generation, this study, by focusing on quantifiers
only, shows that even within a smaller group of scalar expressions, the extent to
which these expressions give rise to an upper-bound is great.
There are two apparent ways to interpret the results reported here: The first
possibility is that the three groups of quantifiers that emerged—fractions, existential
quantifiers, and vague quantifiers of large degree—differ in their likelihoods to give
rise to scalar implicature due to their contrastive lexical semantics, as shown in (14).
The second possibility is that the division into groups is a misinterpretation of the
data and in fact the extent to which a scalar implicature is generated is a function
of the scalar distance of the quantifier from the upper-bound of the scale associated
with it, i.e. all, as shown in (15).
(14) Three groups w.r.t. to their compatibility with all from least to most compati-
ble:
{a third / a quarter / half / a couple} ≺4 {a handful / a number / a bunch} ≺
{a multitude / most / a great deal}
(15) Compatibility with all from least to most - merely ordered:
a third ≺ a quarter ≺ half ≺ a couple ≺ a few ≺ a handful ≺ a number ≺ a
bunch ≺ a multitude ≺ most ≺ a great deal
6.1 Lexical semantics feeds pragmatic upper-bound construals
Recall (and consult (14)) that the quantifiers that were the least compatible with
all were a third, a quarter, half and a couple, followed by a handful, a number
and a bunch (with a few straddling the two groups), and that the quantifiers that
were the most compatible with all were a multitude, most and a great deal. Do the
quantifiers in each group that emerges from the results share any other properties
other than likelihood of scalar implicature? If so, can these properties be attributed
to the different likelihood of scalar implicature each group of quantifiers exhibits?
In the next sections I show that these three groups of quantifiers in fact share a few
semantic characteristics that may suggest that they are semantically-coherent groups.
4 The quantifier a few resides somewhere in the statistical twilight zone between the first and second
group.
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6.1.1 Fractions
Note that the first group included mostly fractions: a third, a quarter, half with the
exception of a couple, which is ambiguous between as ‘two’ and ‘small quantity
approximating two.’ The central shared property of these quantifiers is that they are
all ambiguous between a precise and approximate reading. In order to resolve this
ambiguity, they can be modified by the slack regulator exactly or approximately, in
contrast with the quantifiers in the other two groups (Lasersohn 1999; Sauerland
& Stateva 2007).5 What this suggests is that fractions and a couple denote an
upper-bound that can either be mapped onto a range (the approximate reading) or an
exact fraction or number (the exact reading). The levels of granularity determines
whether we get the approximate or the exact reading, but in either reading there is
an upper-bound that excludes all (and larger fractions on the scale).
(16) a. {exactly / approximately} {a third / a quarter / half / a couple}
b. # {exactly / approximately}

a bunch a few
a great deal a handful
a multitude most
a number

The move to analyze fractions as having an upper-bound is similar to the growing
evidence and arguments for a two-sided analysis of numbers in contrast with the
classic view, in which number words have a one-sided semantics (Horn 1992;
Musolino 2004; Geurts 2006; Huang, Spelke & Snedeker 2013; Kennedy 2013). One
of the tests in which numbers and fractions pattern together to the exclusion of some
is the negation test give below (Kennedy 2013). On the assumption that the negation
in the first clause can either target the semantic content or the pragmatically-enriched
utterance, but not both, saying in (17) that neither Buffy nor Willow read many
books cannot be followed by saying that Buffy read some, negating the semantic
content, and that Willow read all, negating the pragmatically-enriched content. Such
a continuation with numbers words, as in (18), is felicitous, strongly suggesting that
the two-sided meaning of numbers is semantic and so can be negated and corrected
without the zeugma effect in (17). Fractions seem to pattern with number words:
The coherent continuation in (19) suggests that the upper-bound reading of third is
part of the semantic content, and so a quarter and all are both likely corrections.
(17) # Neither Buffy nor Willow read many of the books; Buffy read some and
Willow read all.
5 Some of the quantifiers in the other two groups are marginally felicitous when modified by approxi-
mately, possibly because this modifier reinforces the approximate reading. None of them, however, is
compatible with exactly.
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(18) Neither Buffy nor Willow fought three vampires; Buffy fought two and
Willow fought four.
(19) Neither Buffy nor Willow lost a third of their respective weapon arsenals;
Buffy lost a quarter of it and Willow lost all of it.
6.1.2 Existential quantifiers and their ilk
The second group of quantifiers with respect to the likelihood of implicature genera-
tion are the existential quantifiers a handful, a number and a bunch. These quantifiers
were significantly more compatible with all than the fractions discussed in Section
6.1.1. Unlike these three quantifiers, the quantifier a few wasn’t significantly differ-
ent than all fractions or all the vague quantity expressions (e.g., a multitude) but will
be discussed here together with the other existential quantifiers.
How do these existential quantifiers differ from the existential quantifier some?
As already shown in Section 4, Horn’s (2001) suspender test, illustrated in (9-10),
suggests that a handful asymmetrically entails some. Applying this test to the other
existential quantifiers in (20-22) shows that they all assymetrically entail some, too.6
(20) a. When we stayed here there were some if not a few children there as
expected, but none of them were running wild as the other comments
state.7
b. # When we stayed here there were a few if not some of the children there
as expected, but none of them were running wild as the other comments
state.
(21) a. Despite my wish to use some if not a number of these suggestions com-
bined, my business partner vetoed my desire.8
b. # Despite my wish to use a number if not some of these suggestions
combined, my business partner vetoed my desire.
(22) a. I’m really hoping that some, if not a bunch of us, can get together and
have some fun that weekend and hang out and have a little get together!9
b. # I’m really hoping that a bunch, if not some of us, can get together and
have some fun that weekend and hang out and have a little get together!
These existential quantifiers thus share the basic existential meaning of some and
encode in addition something like a ‘small quantity’ meaning. I leave the question of
6 The same kind of contrast is observed when but not or or even is substituted for if not.
7 Source: http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/ShowUserReviews-g662606-d291481-r135574713-Costa_
Adeje_Gran_Hotel-Costa_Adeje_Adeje_Tenerife_Canary_Islands.html
8 Source: http://steelwhitetable.org/2011/06/24/contest-name-new-popcorn-business
9 Source: https://www.facebook.com/theCHIVEReno/posts/454623144689389
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whether the small quantity meaning can be captured with a semantics similar to the
one Solt (2009) proposes for few, but if we use the suspender test again, contrasting
these quantifiers with many, which denotes a contextually-determined large quantity
(Solt 2009), we see that they implicate ‘not many.’
(23) a. # Many people, if not/but not { a number / a bunch / a handful / a few}
b. {A number of / A bunch of / A handful of / A few} students came if
not/but not many.
Quite a few experimental studies show that while the implicature ‘some but not
all’ for utterances with some is frequent, the scalar implicature isn’t always generated
(Bott & Noveck 2004; Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini & Meroni 2005;
Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer & Bastide 2007, inter alia). This is similar to the
middling compatibility ratings of statements with these quantifiers with FACTs with
all (means of −1 to 1).
6.1.3 Vague quantity expressions
The third class of quantifiers with respect to their compatibility with subsequent
utterances with all includes a multitude, most and a great deal. These quantifiers
were the most compatible with FACTs containing all. The semantic properties these
quantifiers share that may render them more likely to be compatible with all are (i)
these quantifiers’ denoting a large quantity and (ii) their context sensitivity.
That the quantifiers a multitude and a great deal denote large quantities is
apparent from the requirement that whenever a proposition containing either one is
true, the same proposition with many substituted for either one must be true, too, as
illustrated in (24). The suspender test in (25) and (26) suggests that a multitude and
a great deal entail many. It may be the case, then, that these two quantifiers denote
something similar to many plus an additional emphatic meaning.
(24) # {A multitude / A great deal} of the questions appear to have come from
teen library patrons, but not many of the questions have come from teen
library patrons.
(25) a. The university has many, if not a multitude of ‘lines of flight’ available
to it.10
b. # The university has a multitude, if not many ‘lines of flight’ available
to it.
(26) a. The New York Daily News reports that many of the pill bottles, if
not a great deal of them, were not labeled and were probably older
prescriptions.
10 Source: Barnett, Ronald. 2013. Imagining the University. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
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b. # The New York Daily News reports that a great deal of the pill bot-
tles, if not many of them, were not labeled and were probably older
prescriptions.
The obvious next question is how most fits in this picture. Under the generalized
quantifier theory, Most As are B is true just in case the cardinality of the As that
are B is greater than the cardinality of the As that aren’t B, as formalized in (27)
(Barwise & Cooper 1981).
(27) JmostK (A)(B) = 1 iff | A∩B |>| A−B |
However, nothing in this GQT-style denotation says anything about whether the
cardinality of |A∩B | corresponds to a large quantity, and for a good reason. Suppose,
for example, that we talk about three types of whiskey that received a prize, and I say
that most of these whiskies were Japanese. You would conclude that two whiskies
out of the three that received the prize were Japanese but wouldn’t necessarily
conclude that many Japanese whiskies got a prize, given that there are nine active
Japanese distilleries (Baker 2004). And so, even under a decompositional analysis
of most, the silent counting quantifier (or gradable modifier that modifies plural
NPs ranging over pluralities) many that combines with the superlative morpheme
-est (Hackl 2009) is not the quantity adjective many (Solt 2009). This point can
be further illustrated by the fact that the complement set of As that are B can also
include a large number above a contextually-salient standard of large quantity, as the
continuation with many in (28) exemplifies.
(28) Most students passed the exam, but many didn’t.
What the semantics in (27) does achieve, however, is the lower-bound (one-
sided) semantics of most assumed by many Neo-Griceans (Gazdar (1979) et seq.),
leaving the upper-bound inference to be derived as scalar implicature. Contrary to
the Neo-Gricean approach, Ariel (2004) argues that most has a two-sided semantics,
specifically “a proper subset which is the largest subset given any partitioning of the
complement subset,” but argues that this semantics doesn’t have an ‘all’-exclusion
entailment. Ariel’s (2004) analysis accounts for the cases in which most is interpreted
as ‘not all,’ following the two-sided semantics, as well as the cases in which most is
compatible with ‘all,’ arguing that the asserted lexical meaning of most is distinct
from the truth compatibility of most with that of all. Under this approach, it’s not
surprising that responses for most, which doesn’t implicate ‘not all,’ are different
than responses for, e.g., a few, which does implicate ‘not all.’ The question that
remains is that if the notion of compatibility, calculated pragmatically, is distinct
from the semantic content, then what drives the variation in compatibility with all?
If we generalize Ariel’s (2004) approach to all quantifiers, then there should be no
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difference in their compatibility with all, contrary to the results presented in this
study.
In conclusion, the group of expressions that were the most compatible with
utterances with all is a mixed group consisting of two vague quantity expressions
and the proportional quantifier most. In the case of a multitude and a great deal, it’s
possible that since these expressions denote a context-dependent large quantity, all
isn’t a likely alternative in a similar way that the tallest isn’t a likely alternative to
tall. Relatedly, Doran et al. (2009) found that scalar implicatures arise less often for
gradable adjectives than for other scalar expressions, like quantifiers and modals.
Most, on the face of it, shouldn’t pattern with the vague quantity expressions, given
that by virtue of it denoting a proportion of the set, it should evoke an alternative
with an expression that takes the entire set, namely all. Ariel’s (2004) analysis,
whereby most doesn’t exclude all, doesn’t explain the lower compatibility rates of
other quantifiers that don’t have an upper bound, e.g., a few. It’s possible, then,
that all was interpreted in a hyperbolical way; that is, all is used here to mean ‘a
considerably large quantity,’ as in the sentence in (29), uttered by a surprised child
that was expecting to eat a large slice of cake but realized that only a thin sliver was
left.
(29) You ate all the cake!
6.1.4 Caveats to, and potential pitfalls of, the lexical semantic account
The quantifiers studied here seem to form three groups whose shared characteristics
are fairly intuitive: fractions, which denote an upper bound albeit subject to pre-
cisification; existential quantifiers, which pattern with some with respect to scalar
implicature; and vague quantity expressions that denote a large quantity.
But while these three groups seem semantically coherent, a growing number
of studies point to lack of uniformity with respect to implicature strength among
scalar expressions (Doran et al. 2009; van Tiel et al. 2014), among different types
of generalized conversational implicatures (Doran et al. 2012), and even under
different structural and discursive contexts for the most studied scalar implicature
‘not all’ derived from some (Degen 2015). And so, providing an account that banks
on one factor (semantic properties) is a good start but may be misleading, as the
semantic properties sketched in this section may in fact interact with additional,
previously-studied or yet uncovered, factors.
6.2 Scalar distance strengthens pragmatic upper-bound construals
van Tiel et al. (2014) found that the reliable factors contributing to the likelihood
to draw a scalar implicature are scale boundedness and scale association. Scalar
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expressions that lie on a scale whose strongest term is maximal, e.g., <all, some>
and <succeed, attempt> are more likely to lead to an implicature than scalar ex-
pressions on a scale whose strongest term has a one-sided, lower bound meaning,
e.g., <beautiful, good-looking>.11 In addition, scalar expressions are more likely to
lead to the implicature that a stronger term doesn’t hold if the two expressions are
frequent collocates and if their semantic distance is great.
As the quantifiers studied here can all be argued to lie on an upper-bounded scale
with all as the maximal alternate, boundedness was controlled for. Estimates of
scale association for only some of the quantifiers were found in the Google Web 1T
5-Gram. As given in Table 2, among the quantifiers examined in the experiment,
only most, a few and half had high enough frequency ( f ≥ 100) and collocated with
all, using the structural cues Q if not/but not/ and perhaps/and maybe all (see under
the N-gram column). The scores for some and many were added in the table for
comparison. It’s clear that most is the most associated with all, with a few and half
trailing behind. Note also that some and many frequently collocate with all.
On the assumption that stronger association between a quantifier and all increases
the probability to draw the scalar implicature ‘not all,’ then we would expect most to
have the highest implicature rate, followed by some and many, which weren’t tested
in this experiment, with a few and half being less likely to give rise to implicatures.
The compatibility scores with all, however, show the opposite effect: half is more
likely to give rise to an implicature than a few and most. That said, a future, more
careful calculation of collocation is warranted,12 as well as experimental work that
explicitly surveys the degree of association as well as perceived distance between
the various quantifiers and all.
For lack of experimental data on association and distance, I plot in Figure
2 the quantifiers with respect to the lower and upper bound they semantically
and pragmatically mean. What this Figure captures isn’t the perceived distance
in meaning between the various quantifiers and all but rather what the range of
proportions each one of these quantifiers may denote. I assume that fractions denote
the precise meaning with an error range that allows for a range of proportions
depending on the level of granularity intended by the speaker. The existential
quantifiers require a meaning above 0, with a hypothetical intended proportion that
includes the entire set, i.e., ‘all.’ The vague quantity expressions (excluding most)
11 Doran et al. (2009) originally set out to test whether scale structure (discrete or continuous) and
boundedness (open or closed) affect the degree of implicature (Baker, Berends, Djalali, Doran,
Larson, McNabb & Ward 2008) but ultimately found that expression type (divided into the categories
numerals, quantifiers and modals, and gradable adjectives) was a more reliable factor.
12 Google Web 1T 5-Gram Database, for example, is an extremely large corpus but less accurate than
others, such as the British National Corpus (Evert 2010; Michel, Shen, Aiden, Veres, Gray, Pickett,
Hoiberg, Clancy, Norvig, Orwant et al. 2011; Biemann, Bildhauer, Evert, Goldhahn, Quasthoff,
Schäfer, Simon, Swiezinski & Zesch 2013).
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Quantifier N-gram t-score Frequency
most most if not all 369.83 138580
most, but not all 284.45 81901
most but not all 167.61 31118
most, and perhaps all 23.87 581
some some but not all 263.64 73541
some if not all 91.92 10707
some, and perhaps all 18.76 367
many many if not all 116.75 14988
many but not all 115.21 15560
many, and perhaps all 14.91 231
a few a few but not all 20.08 433
half half, if not all 10.51 214
half, but not all 6.09 186
half if not all -6.80 115
half but not all -13.88 151
Table 2 Collocations of a few quantifiers with all
denote a larger quantity, here arbitrarily represented as a proportion of more than
half and including the entire set. Note that most’s range in the plot only approaches
the proportion 1.0 although in some contexts it would be compatible with it (Ariel
2004).
If the range of posited communicated proportions given in Figure 2 is correct,
then just considering the potential intended range of meaning of each quantifier
would predict how compatible it would be with all. Put in other words, predicting
what possible subsets each quantifier denotes predicts the degree to which the
implicature ‘not all’ is likely to arise even without developing a more complex
division between groups of quantifiers based on their shared semantic properties.
The next step is to collect data about speakers’ prior expectations of the range of
potential proportions each of these quantifiers can be used to refer to, and if indeed
these are similar to those hypothesized in Figure 2, then these prior expectations
may very well be a crucial factor is the probability of a speaker to generate the scalar
implicature ‘not all.’
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Figure 2 Posited communicated proportions for 13 quantifiers
6.3 At most and existential presupposition
Most of this section was dedicated to the interpretation of the compatibility of
the 11 studied quantifiers with all when they were unmodified. The compatibility
scores for unmodified quantifiers were varied in comparison with their compatibility
scores when modified by at most. There, they were consistently incompatible
with all, as expected. On the assumption that at most Q creates a downward-
monotone environment, it should be compatible with none as well as with some,
as already discussed in Section 4. Participants in these experiments, however, gave
all quantifiers modified by at most high compatibility scores with some and low
compatibility scores with none. Though very low, the compatibility scores with none
were significantly higher than those for all.
The results from this study, then, point to an interpretation of at most Q, where
Q stands for the 11 quantifiers studied in this experiment, that either includes an
existential presupposition—consistent with Krifka’s (1999) observations—or some
inference to that effect, which excludes the possibility of an empty set. The preferred
inference under which the entailment that none of the Q is blocked given the assertion
at most Q is reported in Sanford & Moxey 2004. They account for their results
by appealing to the distinction between denial and affirmation. Denial is an often
pragmatic property association with negation (Horn 2001). A listener that hears the
assertion in (30) supposes that the speaker had reason to expect (that the listener had
reason to expect) that Buffy had fought vampires last night. The assertion in (30)
thus denies the expected state of affairs.
(30) Buffy didn’t fight any vampires last night.
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Klima (1964) observes that tag questions point to whether a sentence is a negative
or an affirmative sentence. The negative sentence in (31a), for example, takes did
she? as a tag, whereas the affirmative sentence in (31b) takes didn’t she? as a tag.
(31) a. Buffy didn’t fight any vampires last night, {did she / *didn’t she}?
b. Buffy fought a couple vampires last night, {*did she / didn’t she}?
And so, if a positive tag as in (31a) points to sentence negation or a denial of a
presupposed or expected state of affairs and a negative tag as in (31b) points to an
affirmative sentence, then the well-formedness of didn’t she? in (32) suggests that at
most Q forms an assertion even though it’s analytically monotone decreasing.
(32) Buffy fought at most some of the vampires last night, {*did she / didn’t she}?
In conclusion, despite the monotone-decreasing property of at most Q, which
includes the empty set (i.e., none of the N), listeners reject this inference possibly
because sentences with at most Q form assertions and not denials of expected states
of affairs. When a speaker uses an assertion with at most Q, then the quantity denoted
by Q has to be relevant to the exclusion of the empty set.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a first, systematic investigation of the degree to which various
quantifiers give rise to the implicature ‘not all’ using an utterance compatibility task
with a modified Likert scale. Two accounts for the variation among quantifiers were
proposed: (i) shared semantic properties among three coherent groups of quantifiers
account for the degree they give rise to upper-bound implicature; or (ii) the likelihood
of an implicature is a function of the scalar distance between the various quantifiers
and ‘all.’ The predictions these two accounts make were discussed, charting the way
to a future investigation of the heterogeneity of scalar implicature.
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